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Although previous studies have suggested that conflict control can occur in the absence
of consciousness, the brain mechanisms underlying unconscious and conscious conflict
control remain unclear. The current study used a rapid event-related functional magnetic
resonance imaging design to collect data from 24 participants while they performed
a masked Stroop priming task under both conscious and unconscious conditions.
The results revealed that the fronto-parietal conflict network, including medial frontal
cortex (MFC), left and right dorsal lateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC), and posterior parietal
cortex (PPC), was activated by both conscious and unconscious Stroop priming, even
though in MFC and left DLPFC the activations elicited by unconscious Stroop priming
were smaller than conscious Stroop priming. The findings provide evidence for the
existence of quantitative differences between the neural substrates of conscious and
unconscious conflict control.
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INTRODUCTION
Cognitive control refers to the ability to coordinate our thoughts and actions to achieve internal
goal-directed behavior, including flexibly switching between tasks/mental sets, voluntarily initiating
and overcoming habitual responses, and monitoring and resolving conflict (Brass et al., 2005;
Jiang et al., 2013b). One of the most widely used paradigms to study the mechanisms of cognitive
control is the Stroop color-naming task (Stroop, 1935). In the classic Stroop task, participants are
instructed to name the ink color of color words. On congruent trials, the meaning of the color
word and the ink color are identical (e.g., the word ‘‘red’’ written in red ink); on incongruent trials,
the meaning of color word and the ink color are different (e.g., the word ‘‘blue’’ written in red
ink; MacDonald et al., 2000). Typically, RTs and/or error rates (ERs) are significantly higher on
incongruent than congruent trials. The size of the Stroop effect can be interpreted as the amount of
conflict experienced between naming the ink color and inhibiting the automatic tendency to read
the word (Panadero et al., 2015).
Previous research has extensively studied the neural substrates of the Stroop effect,
revealing both frontal and parietal cortices and sub-cortices are activated, including the medial
frontal cortex (MFC) (e.g., anterior cingulate cortex (ACC), pre-supplementary motor cortex
(pre-SMA), supplementary motor cortex (SMA)), the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC),
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the inferior frontal gyrus (IFG)/insula, superior frontal gyrus
(SFG), the posterior parietal cortex (PPC; e.g., superior/inferior
parietal lobule), precuneus, middle/inferior temporal cortex, and
thalamas (MacDonald et al., 2000; MacLeod and MacDonald,
2000; Egner and Hirsch, 2005; van Veen and Carter, 2005;
Nee et al., 2007). The resolution of conflict experienced in the
Stroop has been explained by a computational model termed
the conflict-monitoring hypothesis (Botvinick et al., 2001, 2004).
According to this framework, theMFC/ACC acts as performance
monitoring device that detects conflict and then propagates the
signal to other brain regions, in particular the DLPFC, in order
to recruit cognitive control and implement strategic adjustments
in subsequent performance to resolve the conflict (MacDonald
et al., 2000; Panadero et al., 2015). The conflict-monitoring
hypothesis does not specify the role of consciousness in that
cognitive control network (Mayr, 2004). That is, the role of
consciousness in cognitive control is not specified (for reviews,
see Desender and Van den Bussche, 2012; Kunde et al., 2012; van
Gaal et al., 2012; Ansorge et al., 2014).
Traditionally, consciousness is viewed as a necessary
component of cognitive control (Norman and Shallice, 1986;
Dehaene and Naccache, 2001). The prefrontal cortex not only
plays a key role in recruiting and implementing cognitive
control (Botvinick et al., 2001, 2004), but is also associated
with conscious experience (Kouider and Dehaene, 2007).
Therefore, it seems likely that consciousness is tightly linked
to cognitive control; however, recent studies have convincingly
suggested that unconscious information can trigger some
forms of cognitive control, such as task-switching (Lau and
Passingham, 2007; Reuss et al., 2011) and inhibitory control
(van Gaal et al., 2009, 2010b) to name a few. Nevertheless,
there is still debate about whether conflict detection and
subsequent control can be triggered by unconscious information
(for reviews, see Desender and Van den Bussche, 2012;
Ansorge et al., 2014). This question is the focus of the current
study.
Recently, researchers have attempted to understand the
functions and limitations of consciousness in conflict detection
and control. Using various versions of masked priming tasks,
previous studies showed that the speed and accuracy of
behavioral responses can be modulated by prime-induced
conflict, and the neural correlates of conflict can be detected
regardless of prime awareness. Specifically, participants respond
faster and more accurately to congruent prime-target pairs
compared to incongruent pairs even if the prime was not
consciously perceived (Eimer and Schlaghecken, 1998; van Gaal
et al., 2010a; Desender et al., 2013; Jiang et al., 2013a; Reuss
et al., 2014; Panadero et al., 2015). Using a masked flanker-like
priming task, electroencephalogram (EEG) studies have shown
that unconscious conflict enhances conflict-related mid-frontal
N2 (Jiang et al., 2013b; Panadero et al., 2015) and the power of
theta band (Jiang et al., 2015a). Functional magnetic resonance
imaging (fMRI) studies have shown that unconscious conflict
activates some brain structures related to conflict monitoring
and control such as the ACC, SMA, the DLPFC, and the PPC
(D’Ostilio and Garraux, 2011, 2012). Although unconscious
conflict detection seems to be a well-established, the neural
mechanisms underlying unconscious control and the extent
to which they overlap with conscious control are less well-
understood (for reviews, see Desender and Van den Bussche,
2012; Kunde et al., 2012; van Gaal et al., 2012; Ansorge et al.,
2014). A goal of the current study is to shed some light on this
question.
In the current study, we aimed to further examine brain
mechanisms of unconscious and conscious conflict detection
and control, and to determine the extent of the overlap in
these systems by using a rapid event-related fMRI design in
combination with a masked Stroop priming task. This paradigm
has been validated in unconscious conflict domain studies
(Merikle and Joordens, 1997; Xiang et al., 2013; Panadero
et al., 2015). For example, Merikle and Joordens (1997) asked
participants to name the color of target color patches that
were preceded by a prime word (e.g., ‘‘red’’ or ‘‘green’’).
Meanwhile, they manipulated the presentation duration of
primes so that they were either invisible (unconscious) or
visible (conscious). Similar to the classic Stroop task, they
found that participants responded slower on incongruent trials
than on congruent trials regardless of prime visibility. We
selected this paradigm because conflict in the Stroop priming
task can originate from the response set and the semantic
information, and is therefore more likely to reveal the nature
of unconscious conflict detection and control than a masked
flanker-like priming task. Both conscious and unconscious




Twenty-four undergraduate students (10 females) aged
between 19 and 24 years (M = 21.00, SD = 1.54) were
recruited from campus intranet of Southwest University
in China and participated for monetary compensation. All
participants were right-handed, had normal or corrected-
to-normal vision, were not color-blind, and had no history
of head injury. The local Ethics Committee of Southwest
University approved this study, and written informed consent
in accordance with the Declaration of Helsinki was obtained
from all participants after the explanation of the experimental
protocol.
Apparatus and Stimuli
All stimuli were presented against a gray (RGB: 128, 128,
128) background at the center of a 17′′ Lenovo CRT monitor
(frequency 60 Hz, resolution 1024 × 768, framerate about
16.7 ms) with the E-prime 2.0 Software package (Psychology
Software Tools, Pittsburgh, PA, USA). Participants performed
a masked Stroop priming task, in which the primes were four
white ink Chinese color words (‘‘red’’, ‘‘yellow’’, ’’blue’’, ’’green’’)
appearing in Song font in 36 point size, extending a visual angle
of 0.96◦ × 1.05◦. The masks were made by first overlapping the
four color words, then one of them were randomly selected and
inverted, and finally enlarge it to 1.1× as large as the prime (visual
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FIGURE 1 | Experimental design and behavioral results. (A) Schematic representation of the experimental procedure and event timing. (B) Mean response
times and (C) Mean error rates for congruent and incongruent trials in both conscious and unconscious conditions. Error bars represent the standard error of the
mean (± SEM).
angle: 1.06◦ × 1.16◦). The targets were four patches colored red,
yellow, blue, or green the same size as the masks (Figure 1A).
Design and Procedures
A rapid event-related design was used in the fMRI experimental
task, in which each trial consisted of the following: a fixation
point (300 ms), a forward mask (67 ms), a prime for 33
(unconscious) or 167ms (conscious), a backwardmask (identical
to forward mask; 67 ms), and the target (167 ms; see Figure 1A).
The trial sequences were optimized by optseq21 with an
average trial time of 4 s (ranging from 2 s to 16 s; van Gaal
et al., 2010b). In half of the trials the prime was strongly
masked, and in the other half they were weakly masked.
Participants were instructed to ignore the prime word and
to respond as quickly and accurately as possible to the color
patch. Specifically, one half of them were asked to press ‘‘1’’
with the left index finger if the color of target were red or
yellow, otherwise the color of target were blue or green they
asked to press ‘‘2’’ with the right index finger. The stimulus-
response mapping was counterbalanced across participants.
There were 5 sessions of 128 trials each, and the unconscious
and conscious trials were mixed in each session with the
ratio of congruent and incongruent trials 1:1. Therefore, there
were two factors: Consciousness (unconscious, conscious) and
Congruency (congruent, incongruent).
1http://surfer.nmr.mgh.harvard.edu/optseq/
Before the fMRI experiment, participants completed
48 practice trials outside of the scanner with performance
feedback (mean RT and percentage correct) after each trial. After
the fMRI experiment, participants performed a four-alternative
forced choice (4AF) discrimination task (256 trials, the ratio
of conscious and unconscious trials were 1:1) outside of the
scanner to test the visibility of the primes. The timing was the
same as the fMRI experiment with the following exceptions:
(1) participants responded to the primes by pressing a key to
indicate the word meaning (i.e., ‘‘D’’ = ‘‘red’’, ‘‘F’’ = ‘‘yellow’’,
‘‘J’’ = ‘‘blue’’, ‘‘K’’ = ‘‘green’’); (2) a screen was inserted after the
target on each trial to ask the participants to discriminate the
meaning of the prime. In this task, the participants were told
that there was no time pressure and that we just care about the
accuracy. Before the test trials, participants practiced with 48
trials to master the stimulus-response mapping rule.
Behavioral Data Analysis
Incorrect, miss, and correct trials with an RT < 200 or >1000 ms
were excluded from further analyses (about 4.34%). Reaction
times (RTs) and ERs of conscious and unconscious trials were
separately submitted to a one-way repeated measures analysis of
variance (ANOVA) with congruency (congruent, incongruent)
as the within-subject factor to test the Stroop priming effect. A
one sample t-test on discrimination accuracy was used to analyze
prime visibility. A two-tailed significance level of 0.05 was used
for all behavioral tests.
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fMRI Images Acquisition
The images were acquired with a Siemens 3.0 T scanner
(Siemens Magnetom Trio Tim, Erlangen, Germany). The
T2∗-weighted gradient echo planar imaging (EPI) sequences
was employed to collect 266 volumes per run (repetition time
(TR) = 2000 ms; echo time (TE) = 30 ms; field of view
(FOV) = 220 × 220 mm2; and flip angle = 90◦; matrix
size = 64 × 64). Each volumes includes 32 interleaved slices
with 3 mm thickness and 1 mm interslice gap. High-resolution
T1-weighted images of each participant were also acquired,
which consists of 176 slices with 1 mm thickness (TR= 2000 ms;
TE = 2.52 ms; flip angle = 9◦; FOV = 256 × 256 mm2 ;
voxel size = 1 × 1 × 1 mm). All stimuli were presented on a
back-projection screen, which was viewed via a mirror system
attached to the scanner headcoil. The fMRI scanning session
consisted of 5 sessions and 266 volumes were collected in each
session.
fMRI Data Analyses
Statistical Parametric Mapping (SPM8, Wellcome Department
of Cognitive Neurology, London, UK) software was used
to preprocess and analyze the MRI data in Matlab (Matlab
2009a, Math works, Natick, MA, USA). Functional data
were first temporally and then spatially realigned to
correct for the time difference and small head movements
during image acquisition, respectively. Next, the functional
data were spatially normalized to Montreal Neurological
Institute (MNI) space based on the functional EPI template
implemented in SPM8 and simultaneously resampled to
3 × 3 × 3 mm3 resolution. Finally, the functional data
were smoothed with an 8 mm full-width-at-half-maximum
(FWHM) Gaussian kernel. Given the T1 saturation effects,
five volumes acquired before stimulus presentation were
discarded.
After the preprocessing, five regressors (conscious congruent
[CC], conscious incongruent [CI], unconscious congruent [UC],
unconscious incongruent [UI], and error response) time-locked
to target onset were modeled on the functional data of each
participant and each run to create the design matrix using
general linear model. To correct the head movement related
artifacts, six parameters of head movements were also included
in the model as a covariate of no interest. Each regressor
was convolved with the hemodynamic response function. To
eliminate low-frequency noise, a high-pass filter (σ = 128 s)
was applied. Using one sample t-tests, six first-level contrasts
were created. Specifically, we separately compared CC, CI, UC
and UI with null events, and to examine the neural activity
of typical Stroop priming effect under each conscious level,
we also separately created another two contrasts (conscious
Stroop priming effect: CI > CC and unconscious Stroop
priming effect: UI > UC). Then, the generated contrast
images were submitted to group-level random effect analyses to
estimate error variance across individuals. To directly compare
brain activation of Stroop priming effects between conscious
and unconscious conditions, the group-level full factorial
design comprised the factors of consciousness (conscious vs.
unconscious) and congruency (congruent vs. incongruent). To
include only gray matter (GM) voxels of interest and to
reduce the number of multiple comparisons in the group-level
analyses, we used a GM mask, which has a higher probability
than either white matter (WM) and cerebrospinal fluid (CSF)
[(GM >WM)∩(GM > CSF)] (Villain et al., 2010). Moreover, to
correct for multiple comparisons, 1000 Monte Carlo simulations
were calculated using AlphaSim implemented in AFNI at the
whole-brain threshold of uncorrected p < 0.001 with a cluster
connection radius in 5 mm and an estimate of spatial smoothness
of the residual (Gaussian filter width: FWHMX = 12.17 mm,
FWHMy = 12.26 mm, FWHMz = 12.00 mm, which is estimated
by first averaging the smoothness of the SPM first level GLM
residuals (saved in SPM.xVol.FWHM) across subjects, and then
multiplying the size of voxel, for more details please see the
manual of the SPM8w toolbox2). Using this procedure at a
threshold of p < 0.001 resulted in a cluster threshold of 36
contiguous voxels. The anatomical labels of peak and subpeaks
voxel of significant clusters were determined using the Talairach
atlas (tdclient; Denny et al., 2014), which implemented in the
NeuroElf toolbox (V1.03). The reported coordinates are in MNI
space.
In order to further explore the activation difference between
unconscious and conscious Stroop priming effects, and to avoid
Type I error, we also conducted regions of interests (ROIs)
analyses. First, five ROIs (MFC, left and right DLPFC, left
and right PPC) were defined by intersecting the significant
activation clusters of the main effect of congruency and the
anatomy in Talairach atlas, and then the mean beta values within
each ROI under CC, CI, UC and UI conditions were extracted
by using Marsbar toolbox (Brett et al., 2002), which were
separately submitted to a two-way ANOVA with consciousness
and congruency as within-subject factors.
RESULTS
Discrimination Results
The results of the 4AFC discrimination task showed that accuracy
was not higher than chance level (25%) in the strongly masked
condition (M = 26.54%, t(23) = 1.21, p > 0.05), while accuracy
was far greater than chance level in the weakly masked condition
(M = 86.21%, t(23) = 60.23, p < 0.001); the difference between
the conditions was significant (t(23) = 35.52, p < 0.001).
Therefore, awareness of primes was well manipulated in the
current study.
Behavioral Results
As illustrated in Figures 1B,C, participants responded faster
(unconscious: F(1,23) = 27.81, p < 0.001, η2 = 0.55; conscious:
F(1,23) = 263.13, p < 0.001, η2 = 0.92) and committed fewer
errors (unconscious: F(1,23) = 11.16, p = 0.003, η2 = 0.33;
conscious: F(1,23) = 21.23, p < 0.001, η2 = 0.48) to congruent
trials than to incongruent trials, indicating that the Stroop
priming effect occurred irrespective of prime consciousness.
2https://github.com/ddwagner/SPM8w
3http://neuroelf.net/
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A two-way ANOVA with consciousness and congruency as
within-subject factors showed that the two-way interaction was
significant (RTs: F(1,23) = 160.91, p < 0.001, η2 = 0.88; ERs:
F(1,23) = 10.40, p = 0.004, η2 = 0.31), meaning that the Stroop
priming effect in conscious trials (RTs: M = 53 ms; SE = 3.34 ;
ERs:M = 3.00%; SE= 0.67%) was far larger than in unconscious
trials (RTs:M= 11 ms; SE= 2.10; ERs:M= 1.13%; SE= 0.34%),
both for RTs and ERs.
fMRI Results
Figure 2 shows the activation pattern elicited by conscious and
unconscious Stroop priming effects. In line with previous studies
using the typical Stroop task, the conscious Stroop priming
effect activated the fronto-parietal conflict control network
(MacDonald et al., 2000; MacLeod and MacDonald, 2000; Kerns
et al., 2004; Egner and Hirsch, 2005; Nee et al., 2007), including
the MFC/ACC, DLPFC, pre-SMA, IFG, SFG, insula, PPC (such
as inferior parietal gyrus, superior parietal gyrus) and precuneus
(Figure 2A). In contrast, only part of this network was activated
by the unconscious Stroop priming effect, including the MFC
and precuneus (Figure 2B). Detailed patterns of activation by
unconscious and conscious Stroop priming effects are shown
in Table 1. The conscious and unconscious contrasts showed
that a cluster in MFC (68 of 77 unconsciously activated voxels
overlapped with consciously activated voxels, 88.31% overlap, see
‘‘Supplementary Figure 1’’) activated by Stroop priming effects
very similar. The other clusters nearly not overlap.
From Figure 2B we can see that some key nodes predicted by
the conflict monitoring model, such as DLPFC and MFC/ACC,
were not activated by unconscious Stroop priming conflict
at the above mentioned statistical threshold level. Given
the fact that, subliminal priming effects are very small and
accordingly difficult to detect, the activation threshold and
multiple comparison correction method used in the current
study may be too stringent. Similar to previous studies (Kouider
and Dehaene, 2007; Kouider et al., 2010; van Gaal et al.,
2010b; D’Ostilio and Garraux, 2012), we did an exploratory
analysis on unconscious trials with the criteria that any results
surviving a peak threshold of p < 0.005 uncorrected and
a cluster threshold of 10 contiguous voxels in these regions
were regarded as significant (D’Ostilio and Garraux, 2012).
As shown in Figure 2C and ‘‘Supplementary Table 1’’, this
analysis revealed additional regions of the fronto-parietal conflict
control network were activated by the unconscious Stroop
priming effect, such as right DLPFC, left and right PPC and the
MFC/ACC.
To investigate the difference between conscious and
unconscious conflict control networks, we conducted a group-
level full factorial design analysis. The results showed that
the interaction between consciousness and congruency was
not significant. The main effect of congruency suggested that
the overall Stroop priming effect activated the frontal-parietal
conflict control network, including the MFC/ACC, DLPFC,
PPC, SFG, IFG and insula (see Figure 3A and ‘‘Supplementary
Table 2’’).
As illustrated in Figure 3B, the ANOVAs on the ROI data
showed that the conscious Stroop priming conflicts (MFC:
M = 0.54, SE = 0.08, t(23) = 6.83, p < 0.001; left DLPFC:
M = 0.49, SE = 0.09, t(23) = 5.14, p < 0.001) were larger
than unconscious Stroop priming conflicts (MFC: M = 0.28,
SE = 0.08, t(23) = 3.78, p < 0.001; left DLPFC: M = 0.19,
SE = 0.08, t(23) = 2.47, p = 0.021) at both MFC and left DLPFC,
as indexed by the significant two-way interaction between the
factors of consciousness and congruency (MFC: F(1,23) = 5.51,
p = 0.028, η2 = 0.19; left DLPFC: F(1,23) = 4.83, p = 0.038,
η2 = 0.17), whereas the interactions at right DLPFC (F < 1),
left PPC (F(1,23) = 1.20, p = 0.175, η2 = 0.08) and right PPC
(F < 1) were not significant; the conscious (right DLPFC:
M = 0.40, SE = 0.09, t(23) = 4.25, p < 0.001; left PPC:
M = 0.57, SE = 0.11, t(23) = 5.01, p < 0.001; right PPC:
M = 0.53, SE = 0.12, t(23) = 4.62, p < 0.001) and unconscious
(right DLPFC: M = 0.29, SE = 0.08, t(23) = 3.54, p = 0.002;
left PPC: M = 0.29, SE = 0.12, t(23) = 2.41, p = 0.024;
right PPC: M = 0.39, SE = 0.13, t(23) = 2.92, p = 0.008)
Stroop priming conflict effects were both significant at those
areas.
DISCUSSION
In the current study, we explored the neural substrates of conflict
detection and control at different levels of conflict awareness by
using a masked Stroop priming task. To our knowledge, this is
the first study to reveal differences in the neural correlates of
the Stroop priming effect at different levels of conflict awareness.
Behaviorally, consistent with previous studies using the typical
Stroop task (MacDonald et al., 2000; MacLeod and MacDonald,
2000; Egner and Hirsch, 2005; van Veen and Carter, 2005),
the results showed the Stroop priming effect regardless of the
consciousness of primes, namely, participants responded slower
and less accurately to incongruent trials than to congruent
trials under both conscious and unconscious conditions. On the
neural level, the fMRI results showed that the unconscious and
conscious Stroop priming effects activated the fronto-parietal
conflict control network, including the MFC/ACC, DLPFC
and PPC. Moreover, while most of the blood oxygenation
level dependent (BOLD) signals evoked by the conscious and
unconscious versions of conflict control were very similar, the
neural activity evoked by unconscious Stroop priming was
far weaker and the range was smaller than conscious Stroop
priming.
According to the conflict monitoring hypothesis, the ACC
is associated with conflict detection, which has been confirmed
in various conflict involvement tasks (MacDonald et al., 2000;
MacLeod and MacDonald, 2000; Egner and Hirsch, 2005;
van Veen and Carter, 2005). Consistent with the conflict
monitoring theory and previous work, the current study found
the ACC activated by both conscious and unconscious Stroop
priming conflict. Recently, combining a Flanker-like task and
fMRI methods, D’Ostilio and Garraux (2012) found that
the ACC was involved in response conflict detection even
when the conflict was not consciously perceived. In other
neuroimaging studies, researchers have found that the ACC
is activated when the stimuli presentation sequence violated
implicit probabilistic learning rules (Ursu et al., 2009) or implicit
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FIGURE 2 | Brain regions showing significant activation by conscious and unconscious Stroop priming effects. (A) Regions showing significant activation
by conscious Stroop priming effect. (B) Regions showing significant activation by unconscious Stroop priming effect. The statistical thresholds were set at p < 0.001
with a minimum cluster size of 36 voxels using the AlphaSim Monte Carlo simulation in (A,B). (C) Brain regions showing significant activation by unconscious Stroop
priming effects. The statistical thresholds were set at p < 0.005 with a minimum cluster size of 10 voxels, uncorrected. DLPFC, dorsal lateral prefrontal cortex; PPC,
posterior parietal cortex; ACC, anterior cingulate cortex; MFC, medial frontal cortex.
expectations (Rose et al., 2005), even when the participants
are not consciously aware of the rules or expectations. In
an event related potential study, Xiang et al. (2013) found
that the conscious and unconscious Stroop priming conflict
elicited the N450, a component assumed to reflect conflict
detection, when participants performed a Stroop-like task
similar to the task used in the present study. Further, source
location analyses showed that the N450 component likely
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TABLE 1 | Contrasts (Incongruent > congruent) of brain activations (BA) for both conscious and unconscious Stroop priming effect.
Consciousness Regions Side BA x y z t k
Conscious Superior frontal/Cingulate gyrus L/R 6/8/24/32 8 18 48 7.36 679
middle/superior/inferior/frontal/cingulate/precentral gyrus L 9/40/3/44/6/46 −45 −36 42 6.60 1108
Insula R 13 33 21 6 6.07 77
Middle/Inferior frontal gyrus R 9 45 9 33 5.04 141
Middle/Superior frontal gyrus L 10 −27 42 27 4.85 93
Superior parietal lobule R 7 36 −63 45 4.60 80
Fusiform/middle temporal gyrus L 37 −42 −57 −12 4.28 70
Middle frontal gyrus R 9 45 33 30 4.19 37
Unconscious Precuneus R 31 21 −63 24 6.32 62
Inferior occipital gyrus L 17 −24 −96 −9 5.88 85
Precuneus/cingulate gyrus R 7/31 9 −54 48 5.87 88
Precuneus L 31 −15 −63 24 5.45 53
Cingulate/Medial frontal gyrus L/R 6/24 −9 −3 51 4.84 77
Note: with magnitude and spatial extent thresholds at p < 0.001 and k > 36 voxels, AlphaSim corrected. k-values and t-values are reported for peak voxels of each cluster.
The reported coordinates are in MNI space.
originates in ACC. Similarly, we have found that medial frontal
theta-band power increases in incongruent trials compared
to congruent trials, irrespective of conflict awareness, during
a masked Flanker-like task, an effect that has also been
localized to the ACC (Jiang et al., 2015a). Those studies
suggest that ACC activation is independent of consciousness.
Nevertheless, it is worth noting that there are a few conflicting
findings (Dehaene et al., 2003; Praamstra and Seiss, 2005).
For instance, Dehaene et al. (2003) only found significant
ACC BOLD activity changes for conscious conflict but not
for unconscious conflict in a masked numerical magnitude
judgment task, even though they found a behavioral conflict
effect independent of conflict awareness. However, there
are alternative interpretations of this negative result: first,
given conscious conflict effects were nearly twice as large
as unconscious conflict effects, it may have been difficult to
find statistically significant ACC activation for unconscious
conflict at the thresholds used in the study (Mayr, 2004);
second, there was no baseline condition to compare the
activation of congruent and incongruent conditions (D’Ostilio
and Garraux, 2012); ACC activation is not only found on
incongruent trials but sometimes on congruent trials when
compared with a baseline condition (neutral trials; Roelofs
et al., 2006; Ursu et al., 2009). In the ROI analyses, we
found that the activation of ACC elicited by unconscious
Stroop conflict was smaller relative to conscious Stroop conflict,
possibly because the intensity of conflict elicited was smaller
under the unconscious condition than under the conscious
condition.
In the current study, the left and right DLPFC was
activated by conscious Stroop conflict, which is consistent
with previous fMRI (Kerns, 2006; Kim et al., 2014; Salami
et al., 2014) and electrophysiological studies (Cavanagh et al.,
2009; Nigbur et al., 2012; Cohen and van Gaal, 2013). On
the other hand, there was no significant activation of left or
right DLPFC for unconscious Stroop conflict if a stringent
statistical criterion was adopted (p < 0.001, k > 36, Alphasim
corrected). While a slightly relaxed statistical criterion was
adopted (p < 0.005, k > 10, uncorrected) based on previous
studies, the right DLPFC was activated further indicating that
the conflict was detected in bilateral DLPFC, even though the
unconscious Stroop conflict was far smaller than conscious
Stroop conflict. These results are consistent with previous
neuroimaging studies of unconscious cognitive control that have
shown activity in the DLPFC is modulated by unconscious
conflict (D’Ostilio and Garraux, 2011, 2012; van Gaal et al.,
2011).
In line with previous studies using the classic Stroop task
(van Veen and Carter, 2005; Chen et al., 2013) or a Stroop-
like task (Kim et al., 2010), the current study found that
in addition to frontal regions, posterior parietal areas, such
as PPC (BA 7/40; Kim et al., 2010), were also involved
in conscious and unconscious conflict resolution. The ROI
analyses showed that there was no difference in activation
levels between unconscious and conscious Stroop conflict.
The PPC may adopt the same strength of control to resolve
conflict, even if the unconscious conflict is smaller than
conscious conflict. As a part of fronto-parietal cognitive control
or attentional network, the PPC is generally assumed to
be associated with task-relevant stimulus-response mappings,
stimuli selection, and response transformations or to be
involved in motor preparation and visuomotor integration
during response execution (Andersen and Buneo, 2002; van
Veen and Carter, 2005; Culham et al., 2006). The common
activation in PPC may indicate that both conscious and
unconscious conflict control need top down modulation
from prefrontal regions to posterior parietal regions during
attentional processing or response selection (van Veen and
Carter, 2005; Kim et al., 2010; Chen et al., 2013). In our
recent EEG study, we revealed that the Stroop priming
effect contains both response and semantic/stimulus conflict
regardless of the level of conflict awareness (Jiang et al.,
2015b). Moreover, previous study using the classic Stroop
task demonstrate activation of PPC by both semantic and
response conflict (van Veen and Carter, 2005; Chen et al.,
2013). We did not distinguish between semantic/stimulus
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FIGURE 3 | Brain regions showing significant activation of the overall Stroop priming effects. (A) The overall Stroop priming effects (Incongruent >
congruent). The statistical thresholds were set at p < 0.001 with a minimum cluster size of 36 voxels using the AlphaSim Monte Carlo simulation. (B) The ROI
analyses results. The Stroop prime effects were significant at MFC, left and right DLPFC, and the left and right PPC in both unconscious and conscious conditions,
though the activations in conscious condition were stronger at MFC and left DLPFC than in unconscious condition. MFC, medial frontal cortex; DLPFC, dorsal lateral
prefrontal cortex; PPC, posterior parietal cortex.
and response conflict in the current study, but based on
the previous literature it is like that the PPC activation
found here is also elicited by both semantic and response
conflict.
Whether the difference between conscious and unconscious
cognitive control is quantitative or qualitative has remained an
open question in the literature on unconscious processing. Horga
and Maia (2012) proposed the difference is quantitative, holding
that unconscious and conscious cognitive control might share
the same neural substrates, and that the distinction between
the two likely originates from the quality of representation.
Other works have found evidence of qualitative differences
between conscious and unconscious conflict control (Merikle
and Joordens, 1997; Daza et al., 2002). The intensity and
activation range difference between the unconscious and
conscious Stroop priming effects in the current study appear
to support a quantitative difference, but not necessarily a
qualitative one. The current result did not indicate any area of the
fronto-parietal conflict control network specific to unconscious
and conscious Stroop conflict. In addition, the ROI analyses
only revealed quantitative differences in MFC/ACC and left
DLPFC.
In conclusion, this work suggests that cognitive control
can occur independent of conscious awareness of the conflict,
rather than being tightly linked to it. Moreover, the findings
support the existence of quantitative differences in the neural
substrates of conscious and unconscious conflict control. Our
findings extend our understanding of the mechanisms of
cognitive control and on the limitations and function of
consciousness.
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